We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise …'s provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most …

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise …'s provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most …

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise …'s provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most …

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise …’s provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert’s promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most …

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise …'s provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most …