This paper examines the evolution of a skew distribution of firm sizes from the viewpoint of the 'Bounds' approach to market structure. It confines attention to the role played by non-strategic factors (statistical independence, and cost sideeffects). A model is proposed, which leads to a...

This paper proposes an equilibrium concept for a class of games in which players make irreversible costly decisions; these games have been widely used in the recent I.O. literature. The equilibrium concept is defined, not in the space of strategies, but in the space of (observable) outcomes. It...

A new 45-industry, 23-year, dataset for Japan is used to investigate the duration of industry leadership. A new scaling relationship linking a firm’s current market share with the standard deviation of market share changes is reported. This relationship discriminates in a powerful way between...

This paper reviews the recent literature on game-theoretic models of market structure and their empirical implementation.

This paper traces the time series (?Growth of Firms?) tradition in the study of market structure and looks at how recent studies on entry and the size distribution of firms have modified thinking in this area.

This paper reviews the recent literature on game-theoretic models of market structure and their empirical implementation.

Economists have traditionally taken two very different approaches to studying market structure. One looks to "industry characteristics" to explain why different industries develop in different ways; the other looks to the pattern of firm growth within a "typical" industry to describe the...

This paper examines the evolution of a skew distribution of firm sizes from the viewpoint of the ?Bounds? approach to market structure. It confines attention to the role played by non-strategic factors (statistical independence, and cost side-effects). A model is proposed, which leads to a...

This paper traces the time series (?Growth of Firms?) tradition in the study of market structure and looks at how recent studies on entry and the size distribution of firms have modified thinking in this area.

This paper proposes an equilibrium concept for a class of games in which players make irreversible costly decisions; these games have been widely used in the recent I.O. literature. The equilibrium concept is defined, not in the space of strategies, but in the space of (observable outcomes). It...