Showing 1 - 10 of 55
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334365
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324884
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000884618
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000884624
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000956148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003348232
We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334829
A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342563
In the literature on electoral politics full convergence of policy platforms is usually regarded as socially optimal. Thereason is that risk-averse voters prefer a sure middle-of-the-road policy to a lottery of two extremes with the sameexpectation. In this paper we study the normative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317465