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Swank, Otto H. - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000760509

Committees as active audiences : reputation concerns and information

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2018

payoffs and about his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved, even after the decision has been taken. In such … inconclusive environments, in equilibrium, a member's internal (peer) reputation is based on deliberation patterns, while member …'s external (market) reputation is based on the observed group decision. Either form of reputation concerns create strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895815

Committees as active audiences : reputation concerns and information acquisition

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - In: Journal of public economics 221 (2023), pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014288040

Why are residents reluctant to consult attending physicians?

Swank, Otto H. - 2009

A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378360

When Galatea cares about her Reputation: How having Faith in your Workers reduces their Motivation to shine

Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A.; Swank, Otto H. - 2010

motivate employeeswho are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employeesare driven by monetary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325976

Is transparency to no avail?

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 4, pp. 967-994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195998

When Galatea cares about her reputation : how having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine

Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H. - 2010

motivate employeeswho are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employeesare driven by monetary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382589

The Consequences of Endogenizing Information for Herd Behavior

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003

In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324777

Vanity in Politics: A Problem?

Suurmond, Guido; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2002

Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324778

On Committees of Experts

Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - 2005

A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325304