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Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324884
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326186
At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326387
IPCC (2022) documents a looming gap between climate goals and implemented policies and points to a lack of political commitment. We study policymakers' incentives to commit. A policymaker decides on a policy to encourage citizens to make investments and determines the degree of flexibility to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469588
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334365
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724330
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724339
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097012
This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Public Choice', 129, 435-460.<P> Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255916
At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256020