Showing 1 - 10 of 78
Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324778
This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-makingprocesses in a world where agents must be motivated to collect information. Committees improvethe quality of decision-making by providing information and by coordinating the collection ofinformation. We address two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324872
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324884
We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324900
The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats,advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision haveto be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of asingle agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324998
We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325242
This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325390
Several economists have directed our attention to a finding in the social psychological literature that extrinsic motivation may undermine intrinsic motivation. The self-perception (SP) theory developed by Bem (1972) explains this finding. The crux of this theory is that people remember their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325504
When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325563
Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325637