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Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore … comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507805
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore … comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529939
In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402720
In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406392
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore … comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513018
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore … comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531600
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore … comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011388177
In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403444
In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406447
In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431257