Showing 1 - 10 of 27
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232027
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional --...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239161
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319527
This paper surveys some recent literature on fiscal policy and comparative politics. Economic policy is viewed as the outcome of a game with multiple-principals and multiple-agents. Opportunistic politicians bargain over policy. Rational voters hold them accountable through retrospective voting....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321355
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468518
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional --...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471964
A main question regarding public finance is how well democratic institutions align the interest of voters and the incentives of self-interested politicians. It has been observed that fiscal policy reflects any incentive present in political institutions. In this paper we summarize a recent line...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219532
Observed fiscal policy reflects the incentives embedded in political institutions. In this paper, we illustrate the effects of two general institutional features: separation of powers, which is common in Presidential-Congressional political systems, and legislative cohesion, which is typical of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057224
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061818
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian--as opposed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208362