In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rankenhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who becomes...

In two-sided matching problems, we consider "natural" changes in preferences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rank-enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who becomes...

Economic systems generate various distributions of opportunity sets for individuals to choose consumption bundles. This paper presents an axiomatic analysis on distributions of opportunity sets. We introduce several reasonable properties of distributions of opportunity sets, and characterize the...

Economic systems generate various distributions of opportunity sets for individuals to choose consumption bundles. This paper presents an axiomatic analysis on distributions of opportunity sets. We introduce several reasonable properties of distributions of opportunity sets, and characterize the...

In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rankenhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who becomes...