Showing 1 - 7 of 7
When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is often in conflict with the equity criteria: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y, but y is an equitable allocation whereas x is not. The efficiency-first principle requires to rank an allocation x higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018453
We build a three-stage game model of international negotiations on regulation of global emissions of greenhouse gases, and examine the Pareto optimality of an equilibrium allocation. First, we derive the condition for Pareto optimal allocations, which is an extension of the celebrated Samuelson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018519
The theory of fair allocation is often favourably contrasted with the social choice theory in the search for escape routes from Arrow's impossibility theorem. Its success is commonly attributed to the fact that it is modest in its goal vis-a-vis social choice theory, since it does not aspire for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018577
Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018584
This paper investigates extensions of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics to the framework in which each agent is endowed with three types of preference relations: an allocation preference relation, an opportunity preference relation, and an overall preference relation. It is shown...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018592
Using an extended framework in which an agent is endowed with three types of preference orders: an allocation preference order, an opportunity preference order, and an overall preference order, this paper introduces several notions related to efficiency and equity-as-no-envy and examines the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018627
Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and nondictatorship principles are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018650