We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the … aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a …

We analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and … utilities, where it basically reduces to utilitarianism. In particular, aggregation rules may differ by the relationship between … individual and social indeterminacy. We characterize several subclasses of neutral aggregation rules and show that utilitarian …

We analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and … utilities, where it basically reduces to utilitarianism. In particular, aggregation rules may differ by the relationship between … individual and social indeterminacy. We characterize several subclasses of neutral aggregation rules and show that utilitarian …

We analyze the preference aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined …

We analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and … utilities, where it basically reduces to utilitarianism. In particular, aggregation rules may differ by the relationship between … individual and social indeterminacy. We characterize several subclasses of neutral aggregation rules and show that utilitarian …

We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the … aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a …

We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1995)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the … aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a …

We provide a general theorem on the aggregation of preferences under uncertainty. We study, in the Anscombe …-dependent versions of these models). We prove that aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if (society's) preferences are "smooth … possibility of aggregation of non-smooth preferences. …