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In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate with one another. We introduce a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325416
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326524
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586685
Abstract: We introduce a single-valued solution concept, the so-called average covering tree value, for the class of transferable utility games with limited communication structure represented by a directed graph. The solution is the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090488
AMS classification: 90B18; 91A12; 91A43;
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090586
Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090663
We study transferable utility games with limited cooperation between the agents. The focus is on communication structures where the set of agents forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph. Agents are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090938
Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 91A12, 91A43
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091131
On the class of cycle-free directed graph games with transferable utility solution concepts, called web values, are introduced axiomatically, each one with respect to some specific choice of a management team of the graph. We provide their explicit formula representation and simple recursive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091203