We analyze industrial espionage in a model of two firms: a monopoly incumbent, M, and a potential entrant, E, who owns a noisy intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision a . The IS generates a signal on M’s action and E decides whether or not to enter based on this signal. We show that if...

Our paper provides a justication for the proportional representative (PR) election system for politically diversied societies. We employ the Shapley value concept to measure the political power of parties in a parliament. We prove that for the PR system if parties' size add up to 1 and is...

This article considers the problem of patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly under a class of general demand functions. We consider two cases, the case where the innovator is an outsider and the one where it is one of the incumbent rms. The licensing policies considered are upfront fees,...

Social optimization problems are often used in economics to study important issues. In a social optimization problem, the sum of individual weighted utilities is maximized over all feasible allocations that satisfy certain constraints. In this paper, we provide a mechanism that determines the...

We consider a Cournot Oligopoly market of firms possessing increasing returns to scale technologies. It is shown that an external regulating agency can increase total social welfare without running a deficit. It offers to subsidize one firm an amount which depends on the output level of that...

Two general forms of standard licensing policies are considered for a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation: (a) combination of an upfront fee and uniform linear royalty, and (b) combination of auction and uniform linear royalty. It is shown that in an oligopoly, the total reduction in the cost...