We show that the main claim in Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (JF forthcoming) (DGS), namely "that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components,"...

We show that the main claim in Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (JF forthcoming) (DGS), namely "that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components,"...

We show that the main claim in Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (JF forthcoming) (DGS), namely “that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control...

Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust...

The share of stocks beneficially owned by institutional investors has increased substantially over the last three decades. Together with a high and increasing level of concentration in the asset management industry, this trend implies that a small number of institutional investors now constitute...

The share of stocks beneficially owned by institutional investors has increased substantially over the last three decades. Together with a high and increasing level of concentration in the asset management industry, this trend implies that a small number of institutional investors now constitute...

Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust...

This internet appendix complements the paper "Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership" and is organized as follows: Section I outlines a model of competition under common ownership that yields the network density measure of common ownership concentration we use in the empirical analysis. The...

Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (2017) (DGS) claim to replicate the data construction and results of Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (forthcoming) (AST). While their implementation of the main specifications in AST generates qualitatively similar results, they claim that AST's baseline results are driven...

Kennedy, O'Brien, Song, and Waehrer (2017) replicate the panel results of Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (forthcoming), but argue on theoretical grounds that the estimates should not be interpreted as anti-competitive effects of common ownership. They then develop and estimate alternative models and...