We propose that when firm agents, such as managers and employees, perceive the board to have congruent values about ESG activities with them, then they are more willing to commit their human capital and effort to the ESG activities to increase firm value. Potentially positive NPV ESG projects...

We model limited attention as incomplete usage of publicly available information. Informed players decide whether or not to disclose to observers who sometimes neglect either disclosed signals or the implications of non-disclosure. In equilibrium observers are unrealistically optimistic,...

This paper models firms' choices between alternative means of presenting information, and the effects of different presentations on market prices when investors have limited attention and processing power. In a market equilibrium with partially attentive investors, we examine the effects of...

We define a delayed disclosure ratio (DD) as the fraction of 10-Q financial statement items that are withheld at the earlier quarterly earnings announcement. We find that higher DD firms have a greater delay in investor and analyst response to earnings surprises: (i) the fraction of total market...

Using machine learning–based algorithms, we measure key impressions about sell-side analysts using their LinkedIn photos. We find that impressions of analysts’ trustworthiness (TRUST) and dominance (DOM) are positively associated with forecast accuracy, especially after recent in-person...

Using machine learning-based algorithms, we measure key impressions about sell-side analysts using their LinkedIn profile photos. We find that analysts’ trustworthiness (TRUST) and dominance (DOM) are positively associated with forecast accuracy, especially after recent in-person meetings...

In October 2014, Estimize.com began providing management guidance on its platform for firms that provide guidance. We exploit this exogenous shock to salience of management guidance as a quasi-natural experiment to study how salience of management guidance affects forecasting behavior. Using a...

We test whether earnings management (like a virus) spreads from firm to firm via board connections of shared directors (virus carriers). We use earnings restatements to identify firms that managed earnings and to identify the period when these firms manipulated earnings. We consider firms as...