We outline a model in which preservation of UNESCO heritage sites is analyzed as a classical global public good problem where the decentralized Nash equilibrium yields suboptimal contribution vis-à-vis the Social Planner equilibrium. The absence of a Global Social Planner and the need of...

In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists, a profit maximizing producer (PMP) and a "socially responsible" (SR) producer, compete over prices and "socially and environmentally responsible" features of their products. We show that the PMP finds it optimal to reduce his price...

We examine the behavior of a profit maximizing monopolist in a horizontal differentiation model in which consumers differ in their degree of social responsibility (SR) and consumers SR is dynamically influenced by habit persistence. The model outlines parametric conditions under which (consumer...

We outline a model in which preservation of UNESCO heritage sites is analyzed as a classical global public good problem where the decentralized Nash equilibrium yields suboptimal contribution vis-à-vis the Social Planner equilibrium. The absence of a Global Social Planner and the need of...