type="main" xml:id="ecca12090-abs-0001" <p>We experimentally compare first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting. Both institutions yield identical surplus for the buyer, a difference from prior findings...</p>

We experimentally compare first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting. The two institutions yield the buyer the same surplus, a difference from prior findings with homogeneous products that results...

We compare first-price auctions to an exchange process that we term ``multilateral negotiations.'' In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with privately known costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price...

We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions' seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in...