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Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
Calleja, Pedro; Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2010
We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518895
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Convex games versus clan games
Branzei, Rodica; Dimitrov, Dinko; Tijs, Stef - 2006
the clan by a 'dualize and extend' procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272559
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Convex games versus clan games
Branzei, Rodica; Dimitrov, Dinko; Tijs, Stef - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2006
the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002273
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Convex games versus clan games
Brânzei, Rodica (contributor); Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor) - 2006
the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of … the Weber set of the corresponding games. -- Convex games ; Core , Dual games ; Marginal games ; Total clan games ; Weber …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731215
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Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games
Bjørndal, Endre; Koster, Maurice; Tijs, Stef - In: Computational Statistics 59 (2004) 2, pp. 249-270
-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals … alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847491
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Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
Calleja, Pedro; Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef - In: International Journal of Game Theory 41 (2012) 4, pp. 899-913
This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection … arbitrary set of players, core selection and aggregate monotonicity are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993421
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Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games
Bjørndal, Endre; Koster, Maurice; Tijs, Stef - In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 59 (2004) 2, pp. 249-270
-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals … alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999533
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Information collecting situations and bi-monotonic allocation schemes
Brânzei, Rodica; Tijs, Stef; Timmer, Judith - In: Computational Statistics 54 (2001) 2, pp. 303-313
This paper studies information collecting (IC) situations with the help of cooperative game theory. Relations are established between IC situations and IC games on one hand and information sharing (IS) situations and IS games on the other hand. Further, it is shown that IC games are convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847958
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Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games
Brânzei, Rodica; Fragnelli, Vito; Tijs, Stef - In: Computational Statistics 55 (2002) 1, pp. 93-106
A class of cooperative games arising from economic and operations research situations in which agents with potential individual possibilities are connected via a hierarchy within an organization is introduced. It is shown that the games in this class form a cone which lies in the intersection of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847965
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Information collecting situations and bi-monotonic allocation schemes
Brânzei, Rodica; Tijs, Stef; Timmer, Judith - In: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 54 (2001) 2, pp. 303-313
This paper studies information collecting (IC) situations with the help of cooperative game theory. Relations are established between IC situations and IC games on one hand and information sharing (IS) situations and IS games on the other hand. Further, it is shown that IC games are convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999962