-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals … alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of …

interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions called ψ α -values are …

This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection … arbitrary set of players, core selection and aggregate monotonicity are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player …

-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals … alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of …

interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions called ψ <Superscript …

The main objective of the paper is to study the locus of all core selection and aggregate monotonic point solutions of … a TU-game: the aggregate-monotonic core. Furthermore, we characterize the class of games for which the core and the … aggregate-monotonic core coincide. Finally, we introduce a new family of rules for TU-games which satisfy core selection and …

the clan by a 'dualize and extend' procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …

the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …

the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …

We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and …