This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity, defined either on the set of all games, G <Superscript> N </Superscript>, or on the set of essential games, E <Superscript> N </Superscript> (those with a non-empty imputation set). The main result is that...</superscript></superscript>

In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in...

In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in...

In this paper we look at semi-infinite assignment problems. These are situations where a finite set of agents of one type has to be assigned to an infinite set of agents of another type. This has to be done in such a way that the total profit arising from these assignments is as large as...

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic...

In this paper we look at semi-infinite assignment problems. These are situations where a finite set of agents of one type has to be assigned to an infinite set of agents of another type. This has to be done in such a way that the total profit arising from these assignments is as large as...

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows...

We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur- thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish...