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The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968458
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction interbidderresale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, withpositive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition anddivides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360823