The strategic implications of ties in extensive form games of perfect information are discussed, and a refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium suggested. The idea is that threats and promises have to be credible in order to be part of an equilibrium strategy, as usual, but further that, if...

It is argued that even in games of perfect information there can be unattractive subgame perfect equilibria. This is so when anticipation of threats is taken as the starting point, rather than the threats themselves. Furthermore, there exist equilibria which are not quite subgame perfect...

Most workers are only partially insured against unemployment. One reason is that high unemployment compensation creates a free rider problem when monitoring of job search behavior is limited; people who do not seek employment (non-workers) may nevertheless collect unemployment compensation. We...

This paper discusses aspects of active labour market policy implemented in Denmark after 1993. In particular, we consider effort commitment as a mean to provide work incentives for the jobless, which was introduced as an alternative to reducing unemployment benefits. Our main points are (1) that...

The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.

An uncertain and not just risky situation may be modeled using so-called belief functions assigning lower probabilities to events, that is, to sets of possible outcomes. In this paper we introduce an axiom of consistency by which we extend the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory to...

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) study a market with one seller, two buyers, and voluntary matching. Both the competitive outcome p[subscript c] and the bilateral bargaining outcome p[subscript b] are possible in subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two variations. First, if there is a cost...

We present a dynamic forecast model for the labour market: demand for labour by education and the distribution of labour by education among industries are determined endogenously with overall demand by industry given exogenously. The model is derived from a simple behavioural equation based on a...

The note intends to highlight the relevance of the common-agency model to a characteristic class of problems containing for instance decision making in hierarchies, lobbyism and local authorities competing on being the host for an important activity. Existence for the whole class of...

The so-called Allais Paradox (Allais (1953)) has been interpreted as a violation of the independence axiom of Savage (1954). Considering the standard experiments performed this inference is questionable. Rather the paradoxical behavior represents evidence against the expected utility hypothesis...