This paper extends a basic 'common agency' model of policy determination to a case of a policy vector where lobbies have oppposed interests in one of the instruments. Liberalisation takes the form of an entrant that has to access the incumbent's network, while the incumbent remains vertically...

Shareholder dispersion may be valuable because a credible commitment by shareholders not to interfere allows managers to benefit from their initiatives. A tougher regulatory regime for investors decreases the value of the commitment not to interfere implicit in a more dispersed ownership...

This paper evaluates the main measures that have been used to regulate the interconnection prices in the telecommunication sector. We show that many of the regulations that are applying the vast majority of countries have very little theoretical support, and we identify the restrictions that...

Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated with the sunk nature of investments in network industries. This paper summarizes the author's and others' work in this field (to take stock of several years of research) and, in addition,...

This study computes measures of the degree of independence in practice of telecommunications regulators for Latin American and Caribbean countries in a new data set for 23 countries between 1990 and 2004. We focus on the degree to which governments are able to commit to preserve regulator...

This paper explores the similarity of the underlying economic problems that lead to the establishment of (a) independent central banks to operate national monetary policies and (b) independent regulatory agencies for telecommunications and other utility service industries. We show that, in both...