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Give and take in dictator games
Cappelen, Alexander W.; Nielsen, Ulrik H.; Sørensen, … - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 2, pp. 280-283
It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041625
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A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy
Tyran, Jean-Robert; Sausgruber, Rupert - School of Economics and Political Science, Universität … - 2002
redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences … induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple … redistribution experiment, and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696724
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Give and Take in Dictator Games.
Cappelen, Alexander W.; Nielsen, Ulrik H.; Sørensen, … - Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, Norges Handelshøyskole … - 2012
It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010567131
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Microfoundations of Social Capital
Thöni, Christian; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of … - 2010
about others’ cooperation. Moreover, we show that the “fairness question”, a recently proposed alternative to the standard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325735
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Microfoundations of social capital
Thöni, Christian; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 7-8, pp. 635-643
for cooperation preferences rather than beliefs about others' cooperation. In contrast, the “fairness question”, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056169
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Microfoundations of Social Capital
Thöni, Christian; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2009
cooperation choices and one (using the strategy method) in which they do not matter. We show that the “fairness question”, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008559153
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Second Thoughts on Free Riding
Nielsen, Ulrik H.; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2013
We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010722851
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Second Thoughts on Free Riding
Nielsen, Ulrik H.; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2013
We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734793
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Second thoughts on free riding
Nielsen, Ulrik H.; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 136-139
We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041884
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Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes
Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
There is abundant evidence that many individuals violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in economics. However, powerful evidence also indicates that violations of individual rationality do not necessarily refute the aggregate predictions of standard economic models that assume full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627960