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Serving the Public Interest
Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010
We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622106
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Serving the Public Interest
Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of … - 2010
We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325737
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Serving the Public Interest
Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2010
We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011310737
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Serving the public interest
Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2010
We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344857
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Serving the Public Interest
Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2010
We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195975
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Why people obey the law : experimental evidence from the provision of public goods
Feld, Lars P.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2002
According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408944
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Is there a dividend of democracy? : experimental evidence from cooperation games
Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2023
Do democratically chosen rules lead to more cooperation and, hence, higher efficiency, than imposed rules? To discuss when such a "dividend of democracy" obtains, we review experimental studies in which material incentives remain stacked against cooperation (i.e., free-riding incentives prevail)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014334071
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Money illusion and coordination failure
Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2004
powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient … equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibrium is … selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players' behavior is key for the equilibrium selection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402620
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Money illusion and coordination failure
Fehr, Ernst (contributor); Tyran, Jean-Robert (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001908046
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Money illusion and coordination failure
Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001996362