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The Price of Prejudice
Hedegaard, Morten - 2014
We present a new type of field experiment to investigate ethnic prejudice in the workplace. Our design allows us to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054741
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Risking other people's money : experimental evidence on bonus schemes, competition, and altruism
Andersson, Ola; Holm, Håkan J.; Tyran, Jean-Robert; … - 2013
experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or …We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our … with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline condition without such incentives, we find that the decision makers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010206746
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Why do people vote for charitable donations?
Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013442999
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Civic engagement as a second-order public good : the cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2019
the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060889
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes : an experiment
Puttermann, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344858
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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of … - 2010
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325734
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Microfoundations of Social Capital
Thöni, Christian; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of … - 2010
cooperation behavior and we provide evidence on the microfoundation of this relation. We run a large-scale public goods experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325735
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 9, pp. 1213-1222
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574271
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State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2011
The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836655
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Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2011
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836656