This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits … as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we … evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness absence during …

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits … as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we … evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment … unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …

We study how changes in the maximum benefit duration affect the inflow into unemployment in the Netherlands. Until … August 2003, workers who became unemployed after age 57.5 were entitled to unemployment benefits until the age of 65, after … which they would receive old age pensions. This characteristic made it attractive for workers to enter unemployment shortly …

We study how changes in the maximum benefit duration affect the inflow into unemployment in the Netherlands. Until … August 2003, workers who became unemployed after age 57.5 were entitled to unemployment benefits until the age of 65, after … which they would receive old age pensions. This characteristic made it attractive for workers to enter unemployment shortly …