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An Analysis of the 'Stability Pact'
Beetsma, Roel; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
We analyse the proposed ‘stability pact’ for countries joining a European Monetary Union (EMU). Within EMU shortsighted … accumulation. Hence, although in the absence of EMU governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact, within EMU they prefer … a stability pact which punishes excessive debt accumulation. With idiosyncratic shocks to governments’ budgets, EMU …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661884
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Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union
Uhlig, Harald - 2013
This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319382
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Sovereign default risk and banks in a monetary union
Uhlig, Harald - 2013 - This revision: August 12, 2013
This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009786077
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Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union
Uhlig, Harald - 2013
This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076729
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Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union
Uhlig, Harald - CESifo - 2013
This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877795
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Monetary policy in Europe vs the US: what explains the difference?
Uhlig, Harald - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2009
This paper compares monetary policy in the US and EMU during the last decade, employing an estimated hybrid New …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005089099
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Bundesverfassungsgericht und Krisenpolitik der EZB: Stellungnahmen der Ökonomen
Konrad, Kai A.; Fuest, Clemens; Uhlig, Harald; … - In: Wirtschaftsdienst 93 (2013) 7, pp. 431-454
Am 11. und 12. Juni 2013 hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht Experten zur Krisenpolitik der EZB angehört. Dabei ging es um die Frage, ob oder inwieweit die EZB durch das Outright-Monetary-Transactions-Programm (OMT) Kompetenzen beansprucht, die ihr nicht übertragen worden sind. Wir...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327951
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Long Term Debt and the Political Support of a Monetary Union
Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
eroded political support for actions aimed at enhancing EMU membership chances. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123670
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Fiscal stimulus and distortionary taxation
Drautzburg, Thorsten; Uhlig, Harald - 2011
We quantify the fiscal multipliers in response to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. We extend the benchmark Smets-Wouters (Smets and Wouters, 2007) New Keynesian model, allowing for credit-constrained households, the zero lower bound, government capital and distortionary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010304767
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Fiscal Stimulus and Distortionary Taxation
Drautzburg, Thorsten - 2012
We quantify the fiscal multipliers in response to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. We extend the benchmark Smets-Wouters (2007) New Keynesian model, allowing for credit-constrained households, the zero lower bound, government capital and distortionary taxation. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114666