We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinantsof the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the publicdecision maker (as in the case of bribery) whereas passive waste does not (asin the case of inefficiency due to red tape). To assess the...

We model social media platforms that have proprietary information about their users and sell targeted ad space to producers. Producers, who can be incumbents or entrants, compete for the attention of final consumers. We characterize equilibrium producer entry and consumer welfare in terms of...

We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker (as in the case of bribery) whereas passive waste does not (as in the case of inefficiency due to red tape). To assess the...

We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. We present a joint model of political influence and market competition: an oligopoly lobbies the government over regulation, and competes in the product market shaped by this influence. We show broad conditions for...