From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a global risk, that is, a chance of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, participants have to...

This paper experimentally investigates how monetary incentives and emotions influence behaviour in a two-player power-to-take game. In this game, one player can claim any part of the other's endowment (take rate), and the second player can respond by destroying his or her own endowment. We focus...

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment - like damaging public goods - is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG)...

This paper presents the results of a political stock market in the Netherlands: PAM94. The exchange covered three consecutive elections, allowing trade on five different markets. The predictions at PAM94 appear to be less accurate than those of previous markets of comparable size. Of the...

We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committee's efficiency, and (ii) the extent to which rotation critically influences collective and individual welfare. The experiment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off individual versus common...

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election and the voting decision...

This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after receiving punishment. The focus is on how proposers in a power-to-take game adjust their behavior depending on their fairness perceptions, their experienced emotions, and their interaction with responders. We find that fairness...

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder. We compare the behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs officials that are professionally...

Lobbying is studied in a series of signaling game experiments. Students as well as professional lobbyists are used as subjects. In contrast with some earlier studies, comparing students and professionals, we find significant differences in the behavior of the two subject pools. Professional...

Difficulties faced by the Economic and Monetary Union have strengthened the position of those who advocate a process of (further) political integration in the European Union (EU). A widespread fear is, though, that such a process would favor powerful interest groups able to lobby the EU...