We study a sequential bargaining game with a deadline from which the size of the cake decays. Two bargaining procedures are considered: a model with alternating-offers and a model with iterated simultaneous demands. We show that the bargaining game with alternating-offers has a unique SPE...

Within an incomplete information framework, we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes, which waste industry potential ressources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the...

In this paper, I discriminate among alternative models of bargaining for wages and employment (right-to-manage, efficient bargaining and general bargaining models) using Belgian aggregate data. I estimate the ECM representation of a dynamic employment equation for each model using...

We develop a model of wage determination with private information in an unionized oligopolistic industry and we use it to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures- one in which a single wage is bargained at the industry-level and one in which the...

In normal-form games, rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984, Pearce, 1984) on its own fails to exclude some very implausible strategy choices. Three main refinements of rationalizability have been proposed in the literature: cautious, perfect, and proper rationalizability. Nevertheless, some of...

We study an alternating-offer bargaining game with a deadline from which the size of the cake decays. We consider both the cases of complete and one-sided incomplete information about players’ outside options. We characterize the set of strategy profiles that survive notions of iterated...

This paper studies the valuation of corporate debt contracts in an intertemporal setting under uncertainty taking into account the possibility that the bondholder will be unable to sell his asset. The model considers a coupon paying debt contract with default risk in a binomial setting. Randomly...

The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between bargaining organizational forms and the licensing of cost-reducing innovations, in order to assess the patent holders optimal policy as well as their welfare properties. Trading mechanisms based on bargaining models with...

This paper reconsiders Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information. We define rationalizability for multi-stage games with observed actions. Whe show that rationalizability does not exclude perpetual disagreement or delay. Then, we define trembling-hand...