Showing 1 - 4 of 4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358876
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011951206
This study investigates the structure of optimal incentives in a stochastic environment and provides evidence for the use of self-enforcing relational contracts. We show theoretically that under relational contracting, firms can credibly promise chief executive officers (CEOs) larger bonuses in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053561
This study investigates the structure of optimal incentives in a stochastic environment and provides evidence for the use of self-enforcing relational contracts. We show theoretically that under relational contracting, firms can credibly promise chief executive officers (CEOs) larger bonuses in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781640