bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available …

punishment in a social dilemma. Emotional reaction to free-riding incites individuals to apply sanctions when they are available …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

help enforce social norms (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). However, the rationale for costly punishment remains unclear. This …Cooperation among people who are not related to each other is sustained by the availability of punishment devices which … of punishment. We compare two treatments of a public good game, one in which costly punishment reduces the immediate …

punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to … their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is … punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the …

punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to … their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is … punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the …