Using a real-effort experiment, we study whether group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We vary … whether minimal group identity is induced or not, whether individuals have to report their own outcome or the outcome of their … competitor, and whether pairs of competitors share the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreport in the same …

Using a real-effort experiment, we study whether group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We vary … whether minimal group identity is induced or not, whether individuals have to report their own outcome or the outcome of their … competitor, and whether pairs of competitors share the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreport in the same …

Using a real-effort experiment, we study whether group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We vary … whether minimal group identity is induced or not, whether individuals have to report their own outcome or the outcome of their … competitor, and whether pairs of competitors share the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreport in the same …

individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of … individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self - but also other group members' image. This behavior is frequent … even in the absence of group identity. When group identity is more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the …

individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of … individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self - but also other group members' image, even when group identity is … minimal. When group identity is made more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group …

designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality … aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision …

individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of … individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self- but also other group members' image. This behavior is frequent … even in the absence of group identity. When group identity is more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the …

designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality … aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Within teams, the member with median social preferences leads the team …

We conduct a real-effort experiment where participants choose between individual compensation and team-based pay. In … contrast to tournaments, which are often avoided by women, we find that women choose team-based pay at least as frequently as … gains associated with team production. Women also respond differently to alternative rules for team formation in a manner …

, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with …