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Are Team Members Less Inequality Averse than Individual Decision Makers?

He, Haoran - 2015

aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … decision and the most inequality averse player makes the largest concessions. Finally, social image has little influence except …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033505

Doing Bad to Look Good : Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Pro-Social Behavior

Soraperra, Ivan; Suvorov, Anton; van de Ven, Jeroen; … - 2019

Several studies show that social image concerns stimulate pro-social behavior. We study a setting in which there is uncertainty about which action is pro-social. Then, the quest for a better social image can potentially conflict with genuinely pro-social behavior. This conflict can induce "bad"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014104194

Doing Bad to Look Good : Negative Consequences of Image Concerns on Pro-social Behavior

Soraperra, Ivan - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863238

Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects

Lefèbvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M.; Villeval, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

prospects in a laboratory experiment. Under low stakes, we find the typical risk seeking behavior for small probabilities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008527318

Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand; Villeval, Marie … - HAL - 2010

prospects in a laboratory experiment. Under low stakes, we find the typical risk seeking behavior for small probabilities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791715

Dishonesty as a Collective-Risk Social Dilemma

Jiang, Shuguang; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2022

We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual's earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014296557

Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners' Payoff Vulnerability Matter?

Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2023

another player (e.g., trustor's endowment in a Trust game). Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on … the belief of a co-player who is payoff-vulnerable and/or endowment-vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all, and the decision …-player's vulnerability and to the decision rights of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent vulnerability of the co-player whose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014296704

Social Preferences and Lying Aversion in Children

Maggian, Valeria; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2013

While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329015

Ambiguity on Audits and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

Dai, Zhixin; Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2014

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333263

Self Control and Intertemporal Choice: Evidence from Glucose and Depletion Interventions

Kuhn, Michael A.; Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2014

is an increase in subjects' attention to the decision, rather than their ability to resist the temptation to get money …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333464