Showing 1 - 10 of 13
An important issue in personnel economics is the design of efficient job allocation rules. Firms often use promotions both to sort workers across jobs and to provide them with incentives. However, the Peter Principle states that employees' output tends to fall after a promotion. Lazear (2004)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650044
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agents to increase their effort, whereas the "crowding-out" literature suggests that the opposite may occur. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the employment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790842
Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects ? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899376
Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377262
An important issue in personnel economics is the design of efficient job allocation rules. Firms often use promotions both to sort workers across jobs and to provide them with incentives. However, the Peter Principle states that employees' output tends to fall after a promotion. Lazear (2004)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540647
Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083206
Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or rewards differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907204
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level whereas the quot;crowding-outquot; literature suggests that it may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012717532
Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145354
Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052702