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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513229
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjasa - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024891
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjasa - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024900
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madies, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011214041
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251784
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Respect and relational contracts
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie Claire - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 1, pp. 286-298
study whether symbolic rewards are used by the employers mainly to praise employees or as a coordination device to build … rewards as a coordination device to initiate relational contracts. Compared to the balanced market condition, assigning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597454
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Quitting and peer effects at work
Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2012
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282125
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Quitting and Peer Effects at Work
Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279313
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Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453
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Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2021
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013325263