Showing 1 - 10 of 107
We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359304
The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient "right-to-manage" model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822647
The labor economics literature has shown that the efficient bargaining model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient right-to-manage model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267680
Male and female choices differ in many economic situations, e.g., on the labor market. This paper considers whether such differences are driven by different attitudes towards competition. In our experiment subjects choose between a tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029817
The labor economics literature has shown that the “efficient bargaining” model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient “right-to-manage” model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112709
The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient "right-to-manage" model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003115148
We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former is the traditional vulnerability which arises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013547714
Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011803271
reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay. Other-regarding preferences influence both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940
the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust … same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three … norm in its favor and the weak side agrees : Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858029