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We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086286
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703707
Can a company attract a different type of employee by changing its compensation scheme? Is it sufficient to pay more to increase employees’ motivation? Should a firm provide evaluation feedback to employees based on their absolute or their relative performance? Laboratory experiments can help...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011562948
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012513702
This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates the relationships between inequality and punishment …. In particular, we analyze how inter-personal comparisons affect altruistic punishment behavior. In addition, we examine … how punishment affects inequality over time. We compare two treatments of a two-stage public good game, one in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791276
opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. The punishment is costly for … both the players distributing and those receiving the punishment. Like Fehr and Gaechter, we find that agents often engage … in non-credible costly punishment behavior in order to reduce earnings of others who contribute low amounts to the public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791705
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416586
punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to … their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is … punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011591
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751042
bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359303