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Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving

Garcia, Thomas; Massoni, Sébastien; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2019

A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that …-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation - rather than its benefits - are ambiguous. However, the importance of … excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012152068

The ratio bias phenomenon: fact or artifact?

Lefèbvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M.; Villeval, … - 2009

The ratio bias - according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers - has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277022

The ratio bias phenomenon : fact or artifact?

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M.; Villeval, … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003910098

Motivated memory in dictator games

Saucet, Charlotte; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2018

The memory people have of their past behavior is one of the main sources of information about themselves. To study whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly in social encounters, we designed an experiment in which participants play binary dictator games and then have to recall the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011959856

Guilt aversion in (new) games : does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?

Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2023

We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former is the traditional vulnerability which arises...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013547714

Moral hypocrisy, power and social preferences

Rustichini, Aldo; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2012

We show with a laboratory experiment that individuals adjust their moral principles to the situation and to their actions, just as much as they adjust their actions to their principles. We first elicit the individuals' principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545257

Are teams less inequality averse than individuals?

He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2014

We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359304

Social preferences and lying aversion in children

Maggian, Valeria; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2013

While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229316

Loss aversion and lying behavior : theory, estimation and empirical evidence

Garbarino, Ellen; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2016

We theoretically show that agents with loss-averse preferences facing a decision to receive a bad financial payoff if they report honestly or to receive a better financial payoff if they report dishonestly are more likely to lie to avoid receiving the low payoff the lower the ex-ante probability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011594148

A method to estimate mean lying rates and their full distribution

Garbarino, Ellen; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2018

Studying the likelihood that individuals cheat requires a valid statistical measure of dishonesty. We develop an easy empirical method to measure and compare lying behavior within and across studies to correct for sampling errors. This method estimates the full distribution of lying when agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011906420

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