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We provide a discipline for belief formation through an evolutionary process which favors beliefs leading to higher utility levels at the Walrasian equilibrium. We show that such an evolutionary process converges to the Nash equilibrium in a game of strategic beliefs choices. The asymptotic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037553
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Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successes? Why do investors keep different opinions even though they observe each other and learn from their relative failures and successes? We analyze beliefs dynamics when beliefs result from a very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861623
We provide a discipline for belief formation through a model of subjective beliefs, in which agents hold strategic beliefs. More precisely, we consider beliefs as a strategic variable that agents can choose (consciously or not) in order to maximize their utility at the equilibrium. These...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418531
Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successes? Why do investors keep different opinions even though they observe each other and learn from their relative failures and successes? We analyze beliefs dynamics when beliefs result from a very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636957
Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successes? Why do investors keep different opinions even though they observe each other and learn from their relative failures and successes? We analyze beliefs dynamics when beliefs result from a very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734229
Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successes? Why do investors keep different opinions even though they observe each other and learn from their relative failures and successes? We analyze beliefs dynamics when beliefs result from a very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735042
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783834
In (Viossat, 2006, "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria", forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take part in any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003327803
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