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Committees as active audiences : reputation concerns and information
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2018
payoffs and about his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved, even after the decision has been taken. In such … inconclusive environments, in equilibrium, a member's internal (peer) reputation is based on deliberation patterns, while member …'s external (market) reputation is based on the observed group decision. Either form of reputation concerns create strategic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895815
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Committees as active audiences : reputation concerns and information acquisition
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - In: Journal of public economics 221 (2023), pp. 1-11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014288040
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Is transparency to no avail?
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 4, pp. 967-994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195998
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The Consequences of Endogenizing Information for Herd Behavior
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003
In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324777
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Vanity in Politics: A Problem?
Suurmond, Guido; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2002
Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324778
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On Committees of Experts
Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - 2005
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325304
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On committees of experts
Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - In: The quarterly journal of economics 122 (2007) 1, pp. 337-372
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003434879
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The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003
In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333265
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On committees of experts
Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - 2005
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343285
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Vanity in politics : a problem?
Suurmond, Guido; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2002
Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327825