We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry … earned withless competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribu-tion becomes less unequal, and the … greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external capital and have greater …

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits … voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) entry rates and the total number of producers … accountable political institutions have better investor protection and lower entry costs. We also find that investor protection is …

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits … voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) entry rates and the total number of producers … accountable political institutions have better investor protection and lower entry costs. We also find that investor protection is …

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry … earned withless competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribu-tion becomes less unequal, and the … greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external capital and have greater …

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits … voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) entry rates and the total number of producers … accountable political institutions have better investor protection and lower entry costs. We also find that investor protection is …

entry and financial development. In- cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential … the higher rents earned with less competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribu- tion becomes … 38 countries we find that greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on …

entry and financial development. Incumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants … higher rents earned with less competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribution becomes less … countries we find that greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external …

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits … voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) entry rates and the total number of producers … accountable political institutions have better investor protection and lower entry costs. We also find that investor protection is …

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry … earned withless competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribu-tion becomes less unequal, and the … greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external capital and have greater …