We study the use of asset-backed money in a neoclassical growth model with illiquid capital. A mechanism is delegated control of productive capi- tal and issues claims against the revenue it earns. These claims constitute a form of asset-backed money. The mechanism determines (i) the number of...

While both public and private financial agencies supply asset markets with large quantities of information, they do not necessarily disclose all asset-related information to the general public. This observation leads us to ask what principles might govern the optimal disclosure policy for an...

We study the use of asset-backed money in a neoclassical growth model with illiquid capital. A mechanism is delegated control of productive capi- tal and issues claims against the revenue it earns. These claims constitute a form of asset-backed money. The mechanism determines (i) the number of...

While both public and private financial agencies supply asset markets with large quantities of information, they do not necessarily disclose all asset-related information to the general public. This observation leads us to ask what principles might govern the optimal disclosure policy for an...

Information about asset quality is often not disclosed to asset markets. What principles determine when a financial regulator should disclose or withhold information? We explore this question using a risk-sharing model with intertemporal trade and limited commitment. Information about future...