In a standard New Keynesian model, a myopic central bank concerned with stabilizing inflation and changes in the output gap will implement a policy under discretion that replicates the optimal, timeless perspective, precommitment policy. By stabilizing output gap changes, the central bank...

In this paper, I evaluate the performance deterioration that occurs when the central bank employs an optimal targeting rule that is based on incorrect parameter values. I focus on two parameters — the degree of inflation inertia and the degree of price stickiness. I explicitly account for the...

In this paper, I revisit an old question in the analysis of monetary policy that was first studied by Rogoff (1985) - should central banks pursue objectives that differ systematically from social welfare? I investigate how the answer to this question is affected by the degree of transparency...

In this paper, I evaluate the performance deterioration that occurs when the central bank employs an optimal targeting rule that is based on incorrect parameter values. I focus on two parameters - the degree of inflation inertia and the degree of price stickiness. I explicitly account for the...

In a standard New Keynesian model, a myopic central bank concerned with stabilizing inflation and changes in the output gap will implement a policy under discretion that replicates the optimal, timeless perspective, precommitment policy. By stabilizing output gap changes, the central bank...

In this paper, I revisit an old question in the analysis of monetary policy that was first studied by Rogoff (1985) - should central banks pursue objectives that differ systematically from social welfare? I investigate how the answer to this question is affected by the degree of transparency...

During the past three years, central banks have faced challenges that few foresaw during the period known as the Great Moderation. During the crisis, central banks have responded with traditional interest rate tools, been forced to deal with the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, and...

In a standard New Keynesian model, a myopic central bank concerned with stabilizing inflation and changes in the output gap will implement a policy under discretion that replicates the optimal, timeless perspective, precommitment policy. By stabilizing output gap changes, the central bank...

Central banks often make announcements even though, in models in which dynamic time inconsistency of optimal policy plays a role, they have an incentive to lie. This paper studies the way inflation targeting affects the incentives the central bank faces in announcing its target inflation rate...

Central banks often make announcements even though, in models in which dynamic time inconsistency of optimal policy plays a role, they have an incentive to lie. This paper studies the way inflation targeting affects the incentives the central bank faces in announcing its target inflation rate...