Overconfident CEOs are more willing to initiate investment projects that require experimentation, yet tend to defer responding to the bad news when the project is not performing as planned. Accounting conservatism accelerates the recognition of the bad news and its dissemination to gatekeepers,...

Human estimation and inference are subject to systematic biases such as overconfidence and over-optimism. In contrast to prior research that has identified multiple negative consequences of these biases, we focus on positive effects. We empirically examine a setting in which over-optimism a) is...

We investigate whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures increase stock price crash risk. Consistent with the notion that non-GAAP reporting allows managers to downplay reported bad news in GAAP earnings and re-direct investors' attention to the more positive aspects of performance, our empirical...

We posit that management forecasts that are predictable transformations of realized earnings without random errors are more informative than unbiased forecasts which manifest small but unpredictable errors, even if biased forecasts are less accurate. Consistent with this intuition we find that...

Bundling managerial earnings guidance with quarterly earnings announcements (EAs) has become an increasingly common practice. This study investigates the impact of bundled guidance on analysts’ forecast revisions. Our findings indicate that analysts respond more to bundled guidance than...