We consider a dynamic model featuring two firms that test a regulator’s enforcement propensity through their misconduct and a regulator that disciplines them to build a reputation for strict enforcement. We show that when the regulator has full discretion over the enforcement criterion, peer...

We study the dynamic profit-maximizing selling mechanism in an M&A environment with costly bidder entry and without entry fees. Depending on the parameters, the optimal mechanism is implemented by a standard auction, or by a two-stage procedure with exclusive offers to one bidder followed by an...

We study how investors' use of machine learning methods affects corporate financial reporting decisions. Our model consists of a representative investor who employs a regularized regression (e.g., lasso) to infer value from earnings reports, along with a firm manager who may bias earnings...

In a dynamic model of merger negotiation with two-sided private information two-sided endogenous initiation, this paper investigates (1) what determines the timing of M&A initiation, and (2) who initiates the M&A negotiation; (3) why bid premia are different between target-initiated deals and...