We use a dynamic adjustment model and panel methodology to investigate the determinants of a time-varying optimal capital structure. Because firms may temporarily deviate from their optimal capital structure in the presence of adjustment costs, we also endogenize the adjustment process. In...

This paper analyzes capital structure determinants of UK and continental European firms. Besides considering firmspecific characteristics, it investigates the impact of different corporate governance related institution- and marketspecific aspects on the capital structure choice. The dynamic...

There is an ongoing theoretical debate about whether firm-owners would optimally use stronger or weaker incentive schemes for their managers as productmarket competition increases. Schmidt (1997) shows that the outside options of the managers play a crucial role: if the market for managers is...

The paper provides an up-to-date description of the distribution of female top executives in US corporations. Our data comprise a total of 54'380 observations from 2'489 firms over the time period from 1992 to 2001. Our results suggest that women are working for smaller, faster growing and more...

Our paper is a further contribution to the still very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we investigate the...

There is strong empirical evidence that firms do not always adjust their capital structure according to established capital structure theories. Rather, they follow a passive strategy such that capital structure changes are mainly driven by their stock returns. This paper investigates to what...

This paper analyzes the geographical distribution of physicians across the 26 cantons of Switzerland from 1960 to 1998. We use a dynamic location model to explain physicians' choice for their practices by considering market characteristics and medical infrastructure. Our panel data analysis...

We consider a signaling model with a good and a bad type of firm. The market does a priori not know the firm's type. The firms, which are run by equally qualified managers, can use their debt level to signal their true value to the market. In addition to debt, the manager chooses his effort...