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Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages : experimental evidence on forward induction
Blume, Andreas; Kriss, Peter H.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2014 - Revised version, September 2014
We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre …-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify communication by making the sending of messages optional and costly. Even small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402605
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Coordination, efficiency and pre-play communication with forgone costly messages
Kriss, Peter H.; Blume, Andreas; Weber, Roberto A. - 2011
We examine communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre …-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we introduce two realistic features of communication by making the sending of messages …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009740154
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Legitimacy, Communication and Leadership in the Turnaround Game
Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Weber, Roberto A. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of … randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851357
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Pre-Play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction
Blume, Andreas; Weber, Roberto A.; Kriss, Peter H. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011
We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre …-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify communication by making the sending of messages optional and costly. Even small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358877
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Legitimacy, Communication and Leadership in the Turnaround Game
Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Weber, Roberto A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2014
.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of … randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836458
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Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages : Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction
Blume, Andreas; Kriss, Peter H.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2014
We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre …-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify communication by making the sending of messages optional and costly. Even small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014042214
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Long-term commitment and cooperation
Schneider, Frédéric; Weber, Roberto A. - 2013
We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, allowing players to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332040
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On the Persistence of Strategic Sophistication
Georganas, Sotiris; Healy, Paul J.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2014
We examine whether the Level-k' model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333410
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Growing Groups, Cooperation, and the Rate of Entry
Ranehill, Eva; Schneider, Frédéric; Weber, Roberto A. - 2014
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying rates at which a group grows. Using a laboratory public-good game with voluntary contributions and economies of scale, we construct a situation in which expanding a group’s size yields potential efficiency gains, but only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352437
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On self-serving strategic beliefs
Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, … - 2019
We experimentally study settings where an individual may have an incentive to adopt negative beliefs about another's intentions in order to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study uses a game in which a player can take money from an opponent in order to prevent the opponent from subsequently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993805