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Turning a blind eye, but not the other cheek: On the robustness of costly punishment

Kriss, Peter H.; Weber, Roberto A.; Xiao, Erte - 2015

-social acts? In a laboratory experiment, we find that third parties punish reluctantly: they state a preference to punish, but …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282517

Do Gender Preference Gaps Impact Policy Outcomes?

Ranehill, Eva; Weber, Roberto A. - 2017

laboratory experiment to provide a test of such a connection. In small laboratory “societies,” people repeatedly vote for a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777641

Do gender preference gaps impact policy outcomes?

Ranehill, Eva; Weber, Roberto A. - 2017

laboratory experiment to provide a test of such a connection. In small laboratory "societies", people repeatedly vote for a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011784305

Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry

Ranehill, Eva; Schneider, Frédéric; Weber, Roberto A. - 2013

We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316831

Generosity across contexts

Davis, Alexander L.; Miller, John H.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2011

Extensive research in economics explores generosity in monetary allocations, while generosity in non-laboratory contexts often involves the allocation of consumption goods or non-monetary harm. Psychological evidence suggests that generosity may be higher in such contexts. We compare generosity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316844

Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction

Blume, Andreas; Kriss, Peter H.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2016

We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find that even small communication costs dramatically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522458

Frequent job changes can signal poor work attitude and reduce employability

Cohn, Alain; Maréchal, Michel André; Schneider, Frédéric - 2019

tightly controlled laboratory labor market experiment demonstrates that prior employment information allows employers to … field experiment that varies the frequency of job changes in applicants' resumes and find that those with fewer job changes … receive substantially more callbacks from prospective employers. Third, a survey experiment with Human Resources professionals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143539

Identifying social norms using coordination games : why does dictator game sharing vary?

Krupka, Erin (contributor); Weber, Roberto A. (contributor) - 2008

We explore the influence of social norms on behavior. To do so, we introduce a method for identifying norms, based on the property that social norms reflect social consensus regarding the appropriateness of different possible behaviors. We demonstrate that the norms we elicit, along with a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779108

"Behavioral experiments" in economics

Weber, Roberto A.; Camerer, Colin - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 9 (2006) 3, pp. 187-192

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003351726

Special issue: Behavioral economics

Weber, Roberto A. (contributor); Camerer, Colin (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003351727